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THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:
EMPLOYERS' NEW RESPONSIBILITIES TO
HIV-POSITIVE EMPLOYEES
Laura Pincus*
The right to work, I had assumed, was the most precious liberty that man possesses. Man has indeed as much right to work as
he has to live, to be free, to own property. The American ideal was
stated by Emerson in his essay on Politics, "A man has a right to
be employed, to be trusted, to be loved, to be revered." It does
many men little good to stay alive and free and propertied if they
cannot work. To work means to eat. It also means to live. For
many it would be better to work in jail, than to sit idle on the curb.
The great values of freedom are in the opportunities afforded man
to press to new horizons, to pit his strength against the forces of
nature, to match skills with his fellow man.'
The handicapped live among us. They have the same hopes,
the same fears, and the same ambitions as the rest of us. They are
children and adults, black and white, men and women, rich and
poor. They have problems as varied as their individual personalities.

* Assistant Professor of Business Law, DePaul University, College of Commerce, Department of Management. B.S., Tufts University, 1985; J.D., University of Chicago, 1988.
The author would like to thank Shefali Trivedi and Victoria Geguzys for their assistance with
the research for this Article.
1. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954) (Douglas, C.J., dissenting).
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Yet, they are today a hidden population because their problems are
different from most of ours. Only the bravest risk the dangers and
suffer the discomforts and humiliation they encounter when they try
to live what we consider to be normal, productive lives. In their

quest to achieve the benefits of our society they ask no more than
equality of opportunity.'
Due to the unpredictable nature of Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome ("AIDS") and Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV"),3
employers are naturally concerned about the infected employee's abili-

ty to adequately perform. However, many infected employees are actually perfectly capable of performing most, if not all, of the essential
requirements of their positions. In fact, research has shown that the
performance of a disabled worker equals that of an able-bodied work-

er when the disabled worker is appropriately accommodated. 4 Moreover, the disabled individual may actually surpass his co-workers as
he overcomes the effects of his disability.' Yet, there continues to
exist pervasive discrimination against HIV-infected employees based
on misconceptions related to the condition. As a result, federal law

has become necessary in order to prevent rampant discrimination
against HIV-infected employees as well as non-infected members of
the classes of persons perceived to be at risk.
While federal laws, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964,6 pro-

tected many of America's minorities, individuals with disabilities7
2. 118 CONG. REc. S3320 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1972) (statement of Sen. Williams).
3. AIDS is a life-threatening virus that attacks the immune system, preventing the human body from fighting infections. The disease is caused by HIV. The virus attacks T-Lymphocytes, a type of white blood cell, which assists the body in protecting itself against infection. The assault of the virus occurs in several stages. The first is the asymptomatic HIV
infection. During this stage the individual is contagious and will exhibit detectable abnormalities of the immune system, yet will evidence no physical symptoms of the disease. During
the next stage, the individual begins to show signs of AIDS Related Complex ("ARC") and
may evidence symptoms such as weight loss, fever, night sweats, diarrhea, skin rashes, enlarged lymph nodes, lack of stamina and inability to fight off infection. During the last stage
the individual actually has AIDS. The virus destroys the body's immune system, and the individual thus becomes susceptible to a variety of other infections that cause "opportunistic
diseases" such as pneumonia, meningitis, tuberculosis and cancer. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SURvs., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY
SYNDROME 9-11 (1986) [hereinafter REPORT].
4. ROSCOE L. BARROW & HOWARD D. FARING, EPILEPSY AND THE LAW 64, 65 (1st
ed. 1956).
5. See Stanford D. Herlick, Rehabilitation of Industrially Injured Workers, 25 HASTINGS
LJ. 165, 172 (1973) (citing ASSOCIATION OF CASUALTY AND SUETY COMPANIES, THE
PHYSICALLY IMPAIRED: GUIDEBOOK TO THEIR EMPLOYMENT 1-3 (1952)).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
7. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. II
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have continued to face the frustration of physical and attitudinal em-

ployment barriers.' Consequently, the National Council on Disability
(the "Council"), an independent federal agency that gives recommendations to Congress on the disabled, responded to this problem. The
Council recommended the enactment of comprehensive legislation in

order to stem further discrimination against persons with disabilities.9
Congress reacted by introducing the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (the "ADA").10 Senator Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.) and Sen-

ator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) sponsored the original bill in the Senate;" a similar bill was introduced into the House of Representa-

tives.1 2 The purpose of these two bills was to prohibit discrimination
against individuals with disabilities in employment, public accommo-

dations, public transportation, and telecommunications.' 3 Following
negotiations with congressional sponsors in September of 1989, the
Bush administration agreed to endorse a new Senate version. 4
The bill was subsequently passed by the Senate on September 7,
1989,15 but faced a battle in the House of Representatives. The basis
for the disapproval in the House came from pressure exerted by the
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), which expressed

1990) eliminates the use of the term "handicap," as found in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1988) [hereinafter Rehabilitation Act], and instead introduces the term
"disability." The Senate Report relating to the enactment of the ADA explained the reason
for the change:
The use of the term "disability" instead of "handicap" . . . represents an
effort by the Committee to make use of up-to-date, currently accepted terminology.
In regard to this legislation, as well as in other contexts, the Congress has been
apprised of the fact that to many individuals with disabilities the terminology applied to them is a very significant and sensitive issue.
As with racial and ethnic epithets, the choice of terms to apply to a person
with a disability is overlaid with stereotypes, patronizing attitudes, and other emotional connotations. Many individuals with disabilities and organizations representing
them object to the use of such terms as "handicapped person" or "the handicapped."
S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1989).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)-(3), (5)-(7), (9).
9. Statement By President George Bush Upon Signing S. 933, 26 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 1165 (July 30, 1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601 [hereinafter Statement].
10. Id.
11. 134 CONG. REC. S5106-07 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1988).
12. 134 CONG. REc. E1307 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1988).
13. Statement. supra note 9, at 601; see Eileen P. Kelly & Robert J. Aalberts, Americans With DisabilitiesAct: Undue Hardship for Private Sector Employers?, 41 LAB. L.J. 675,
676 (1990).
14. See Kelley & Aalberts, supra note 13, at 675-76.
15. 135 CONG. REc. SI0,803 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989).
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concerns about the great numbers of employees affected by the AIDS
epidemic and other contagious diseases. 6 Specifically, the concern
was over whether individuals could transmit 7 these types of diseases
by certain types of personal contact or food handling. 8

A compromise on the food handling issue was reached whereby
HIS would be required to publish a list of diseases that may be
transmitted by handling food: "AIDS-infected workers could be reassigned only if HHS found that the disease could be transmitted
through contact with food. Since the weight of scientific opinion indi-

cates that AIDS cannot be transmitted through casual contact, it is
unlikely that the disease will appear on the HHS list."' 9 The amend-

ed version of the ADA was passed by the Senate on July 11,
1990,20 and by the House the following day.21 The ADA was final-

ly signed into law by President George Bush on July 26,

199022

and

portions became effective in January of 1992.23 This law "was widely hailed as a declaration of independence for the disabled and the

most sweeping civil rights law in a quarter century." 24

16. 136 CONG. REC. H4614-30 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (disapproval arose from
concern about treatment of HIV-positive individuals in the food handling industry).
17. There are only four manners in which- to transmit the HIV or AIDS virus: 1)
through sexual contact where there is an exchange of blood or semen; 2) sharing intravenous
drug needles; 3) through blood transfusions or other nonsexual contact with contaminated
blood or blood products; or 4) through an infected mother to her child either in utero or
during post-partum breast feeding. See Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Servs., Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human TLymphotropic Virus Type IIJ/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace, 34 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 682, 682-83 (1985) [hereinafter Recommendations for
the Workplace]. Casual contact with HIV-infected employees is not a risk to others. See
REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-21; Robert S. Klein et al., Low Occupational Risk of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Infection Among Dental Professionals, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 86, 89
(1988) (low occupational risk of infection despite frequent occupational exposure to persons at
increased risk for HIV infection); Alan R. Lifson, Do Alternate Modes for Transmission. of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Exist?, 259 JAMA 1353, 1354 (1988) (risk of transmission
through mouth-to-mouth resuscitation or human bites is extremely low, if present at all);
Merle A. Sande, Transmission of AIDS: The Case Against Casual Contagion, 314 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 380, 382 (1986) (casual contact unlikely to cause infection).
18. See Kelly & Aalberts, supra note 13, at 675-76.
19. Id. at 676; see, e.g., Recommendations for the Workplace,,supra note 17.
20. 136 CONG. REC. S9556 (daily ed. July 11, 1990).
21. 136 CONG. REC. H4614 (daily ed. July 12, 1990).
22. Statement, supra note 9, at 1165.
23. See The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 205(a),
231(a), 246(a), 310(a), 514, 104 Stat. 327, 338. 346, 352, 365, 378 (1990) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213).
24. Kelly & Aalberts, supra note 13, at 684; see also Studio A: Discussion with Ken
DeNiro (National Public Radio, Aug. 6, 1991).
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The ADA protects the civil rights of disabled persons by imposing new requirements on and demanding more of employers. In July
of 1992, businesses with twenty-five or more employees fell under
the ADA's jurisdiction, and in July of 1994, a business with fifteen
or more employees will be subject to this law.2 Consequently, many
businesses in the United States will be affected.26
Given the breadth of the ADA, the first question addressed in
this article is whether an employee with HIV is considered "disabled"

pursuant to the ADA. By 1988, one to two million individuals had
acquired HIV, and through January, 1993, 249,217 AIDS cases had
been reported,27 so the answer to this question should be of great in-

terest to almost every employer. As of May, 1990, more than 83,000

individuals had died as a result of the disease.28 Among men ages
twenty-five to forty-four, AIDS has become the second leading killer.29 If current trends continue, the number of AIDS infections will
only increase in the next several decades. Such statistics are not just
evidence of a serious health concern, but considering the recently

effective law, they may represent a legal concern for every employer.
Further, as a result of misconceptions about the disease, 30 em-

25. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12201.
26. See S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1989).
27. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvs.,
HIV/AlDS SURVEILLANCE: U.S. AIDS CASES REPORTED THROUGH DECEMBER 1992 (1993)

(244,939 AIDS cases reported prior to Dec. 1992); Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't
of Health and Human Servs., 42 MORBIDrrY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 96 (1993) (4278
AIDS cases reported from Dec. 1992 through Jan. 1993); see also AIDS IN THE WORKPLACE
i (CCH ed., 1990); Geralyn M. Franklin & Robert K. Robinson, AIDS and the Law, PERSONNEL ADMIN., Apr. 1988, at 118; James R. Redeker & Jonathan A. Segal, The Legal Ramifications of AIDS Discrimination, BUS. & SOC'Y REv., Spring 1988, at 18.
28. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE: U.S. AIDS CASES REPORTED THROUGH MAY 1990 13-14 (1990).
29. Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Mortality Attributable to HIV Infection/AIDS-United States, 1981-1990, 40 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 41, 41-42 (1991).
30. Much has been misunderstood about HIV, relating to its transmission, contagion, and
disabling effects. For example, of those questioned in a 1987 survey conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics, 21% believed that they were likely or somewhat likely to
catch AIDS by working with someone who has AIDS. ROPER CENTER FOR PUBLIC OPINION
RESEARCH, AIDS: MODES OF CONTAGION 1985, 1987, 1990 (Aug. 8, 1991) (question identification number USNCHS. 87AUG. R07D). The survey also found that 12% believed that it
was likely or somewhat likely that they would contract AIDS by shaking hands or merely
touching someone who has AIDS. Id. (USNCHS. 87AUG. R07G). Furthermore, 16% believed
that they were likely or somewhat likely to contract the disease by kissing an AIDS-infected
individual on the cheek. Id. (USNCHS. 87AUG. R07K).
Fortunately, public opinion may be changing. A comparison of Gallup Polls News
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ployers are now being forced to develop strategies for handling HIVinfected employees in the face of unreasonable and irrational fears of
co-workers, supervisors, and customers. More than twenty-five states
have pronounced discrimination based on AIDS or HIV to be unlawful.3 Most of these proclamations are found in the form of state hu-

man rights acts enforced by state human rights commissions.32
The ADA is the first federal law enacted to protect persons with

AIDS from discrimination by private employers.3 The ADA requires
that employers provide reasonable accommodations to otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities, provided that these accommodations

do not impose an undue burden on the employer.'

However, the

estimated cost of these accommodations is sixteen million dollars. 35
In response to this situation, the next issues discussed in this Article
are what constitutes "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" under the ADA.
In order to avoid additional and unnecessary costs, employers
must also strive to educate their workforces regarding the employment
of disabled workers, including workers who are HIV-positive. While
this Article addresses the need for, and manner by which to imple-

ment, an HIV policy in the workplace, no policy will be effective

Service surveys reveals that 25% of Americans questioned in 1987 believed that employers
should have the right to fire a worker with AIDS. ROPER CENTER FOR PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH, AIDS AND EMPLOYMENT (Aug. 8, 1991) (question identification number
USGALLUP. 112287. RIH). This figure declined to 21% in 1991. Id. (USGALLUP. 051591.
RIG). Likewise, the comparison reveals that there has been a substantial decrease in the
percentage of people who say they would refuse to work alongside a person with AIDS. In
1987 the figure was 25%, id. (USGALLUP. 112287. RIG), while in 1991, the figure reduced
to 16%. Id (USGALLUP. 051591. R1H).
31. Survey Finds Spotty Record In State Handicap Statutes, 4 AIDS Pol'y & Law
(BNA) No. 11, at 3 (June 14, 1989); see also David B. Ritter & Ronald Turner, AIDS:
Employer Concerns and Options, 38 LAB. L.J. 67, 73 (1987) (listing those states which have
officially declared AIDS-based discrimination unlawful, those which have infomally recommended that discrimination based on AIDS is improper, and those which will accept and investigate AIDS-related complaints). The problem of discrimination against HIV-positive employees is permeating our society. In the first six months of 1991, there were 104 cases filed
with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination on the basis of HIV status.
Telephone Interview with John Hem, Associate Director, Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination (Aug. 6, 1991).
32. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. lit. 5, § 19204-B (West 1964 & West Supp. 1992).
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. The actions of government employers, contractors and
agencies are regulated by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87
Stat. 355, 394 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988)).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
35. See 56 Fed. Reg. 8578-79 (1991) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1630) (proposed
Feb. 28, 1991).
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unless, and until, those who will be affected by the policy are educated regarding the rights of disabled employees, and specifically, the
facts about HIV and AIDS in the workplace. The purpose of this
Article is to identify the legal framework in which employers operate,
to discuss the responsibilities of employers to accommodate HIV-infected employees, and to identify the potential liability of employers
in connection with AIDS transmission. The Article concludes by advising employers on how to develop both a plan to comply with the
ADA and an education program by which to implement this plan.
I. THE AMERICANS wiTH DISABILITIES ACT
AND THE REHABILITATION ACT

The ADA grew from section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
19736 (the "Rehabilitation Act"), the first breakthrough for disabled
Americans, which "widen[ed] the doors," as expressed by Attorney
General Dick Thomburgh. 7 While the Rehabilitation Act only covers federally assisted activities, the ADA covers nearly all private and
public entities. Nevertheless, both Acts provide that employers may
not discriminate against otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities on the basis of those disabilities.38 The employer is required to
provide reasonable accommodation of the individual's disability unless
to do so would constitute an undue hardship.39 The Acts protect
both disabled workers and those workers who are perceived to be
disabled but are not actually disabled ° Both Acts protect disabled
individuals from three types of barriers that they confront: (1) intentional discrimination based on social bias against disabled individuals;
(2) neutral standards with disparate impact; and (3) surmountable
impairment barriers.4'
Because the ADA was passed only recently, no court has yet
addressed the application of the Act to HIV-infected workers. However, the language of the ADA virtually parallels that of the Rehabil-

36. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701796i (1988)).
37. Dick Thornburgh, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: What it Means to All Americans, 41 LAB. U. 803, 804 (1990).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988) ("No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap,

. .

. be subjected to

discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ...
39. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5); see 29 U.S.C. §§ 794-794b.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b); see 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, 791-794d.
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itation Act. The legislative history of the ADA evidences a desire to
apply standards to private sector employers similar to those in the
Rehabilitation Act.4' Therefore, case law interpreting the terminology
and effect of the Rehabilitation Act is likewise applicable to an analysis of the ADA, 43 with few modifications.

Despite this, the ADA is dissimilar from the Rehabilitation Act
in several ways. The most significant distinction is that, while the
Rehabilitation Act applies only to federal agencies, contractors and

federal grant recipients," the ADA now imposes these same requirements on private sector employers.4'

Prior to the passage of the

ADA, only federally-assisted employers were required by federal law
to reasonably accommodate employees with disabilities in hiring and
continued employment as long as that accommodation did not result
in an undue hardship upon the employer, pursuant to Sections 503

and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Another distinction is that the
ADA is more stringent than the Rehabilitation Act as it states that an

employer may not discriminate against an individual with a contagious disease,' which includes HIV, 47 unless it can be shown that
the employee poses a direct threat to others.48

Though the ADA may seem comprehensive, it is vague in many
areas. For instance, neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act adequately defines "disability,"49 and the ever-elusive term "reasonable"
has been used to qualify the bounds of the required accommodations. 50 Likewise, it is far from clear at what point the burden of

providing accommodations rises to an "undue hardship."'"

42. "The format of the regulations reflects congressional intent, as expressed in the legislative history, that the regulations implementing the employment provisions of the ADA be
modeled on the regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as
amended, 34 C.F.R. part 104." 56 Fed. Reg. 8578 (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1630) (proposed
Feb. 28, 1991); see also H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 67 (1990); S.
REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1989).
43. See Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app., § 16 30. 2 (g) (1992) [hereinafter ADA Guidelines].
44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793-794 (1988).
45. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), 12111(4), 12112(a).
46. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12113(d); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(e).
47. See, e.g., Robbins v. Clark, 946 F.2d 1331, 1335 (8th Cir. 1991) ("Like AIDS, tuberculosis and hepatitis are merely two specific types of infectious and contagious diseases
48.
49.
50.
51.

42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 706(8), (15).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) (1988) (amended 1988).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1988).
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In an attempt to clarify the extent of the employers' obligations,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") has
promulgated its final rules (the "ADA Regulations") to implement
Title I of the ADA52 as required by the Act.5 3 At the same time
the EEOC issued interpretive guidance (the "ADA Guidelines") on
implementing Title I as an appendix to the ADA Regulations.5 4 Despite these voluminous interpretations, many questions remain. Ultimately, many issues must be determined on a case-by-case basis.5
The evaluation of an individual's right to accommodation or the
burden which such an accommodation places on the employer depends on the nature of the disability as well as the nature of the
employer's operation.56 Courts have wrestled with some of these
terms in connection with a host of maladies in section 504 Rehabilitation Act litigation 57 and are constantly faced with inventive interpretations of the terms and their applications. Given the number of
HIV cases nationwide, 8 it is likely that courts will soon be faced
with numerous cases that will require them to examine the application
of the ADA to that disease. But this new legislation offers HIV-infected employees or employees perceived to be HIV-positive, many
for the first time, the ability to effectively preclude discrimination
based on their contraction of the disease.

II. "DisABILrry" UNDER THE ADA
The relevant sections of the Rehabilitation Act, paralleled by the
ADA, define an individual with a disability as one who (a) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits a major life
activity, (b) has a record of such impairment, or (c) is regarded as
having such an impairment. 9 The Act defines neither "physical [nor]
mental impairment" nor "major life activities." However, the ADA
Regulations define "impairment" as "[a]ny physiological disorder, or

52. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilites Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (1992) [hereinafter ADA Regulations].
53. 42 U.S.C. § 12116.
54. ADA Guidelines, supra note 43.
55. See id. § 1630.2(o).
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B).
57. See, e.g., McWright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding cognizable
claim under Rehabilitation Act where past employee brought suit against employer alleging,
inter alia, discrimination due to her inability to bear children).
58. See REPORT, supra note 3, at 12 (placing the estimate at 1.5 million).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
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condition .. affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or... [a]ny mental or psychological disorder" which substantially limits one of life's
major activities. 6 "Major life activities" is interpreted by the ADA
Regulations as "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and
working." 61 "Substantially limit[ed]" is described by the ADA Regu-

lations as being "[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the
average person in the general population can perform; or...
[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under
62
which an individual can perform a particular major life activity.,
No court has yet applied the ADA to situations involving HIVpositive employees. However, while a federal court determining the
issue is not bound by judicial interpretations of parallel state laws
regarding HIV discrimination in employment, such decisions may be
indicative of the manner in which the ADA may be applied to similar
situations. A federal district court applying a Pennsylvania statute held
that, "[b]ecause of the risk of transmission, an HIV carrier cannot
procreate [a major life activity] 'without endangering the lives of both
the offspring and the other parent."' 63 Therefore, while no court has
reinforced this conclusion in connection with the ADA, it appears that
HIV may be covered by the ADA definition of "disability."
Under the Act's relatively broad definition of "disability," one is
disabled if he or she is "regarded as" having an impairment6 4 The
ADA Regulations state that one is regarded as having an impairment
if, among other possibilities, he or she "[h]as a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment."65 The ADA
Guidelines offer the example of an individual with a disfiguring facial
scar, which does not limit that individual's employment capabili-

60. ADA Regulations, supra note 52, § 1630.2(h)(1)-(2).

61. Id. § 1630.2(i).
62. Id. § 1630.20)(i)-(ii).
63. Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (quoting Doe v. Dolton Ele-

mentary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. Il.1988)); see Robert A. Kushen,
Note, Asymptomatic Infection with the AIDS Virus as a Handicap Under the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 563, 572 (1988).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C).
65. ADA Regulations, supra note 52, § 1630.2(1)(2).
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ties. 66 If the employer discriminates against this person because of
the negative reaction of its customers or clients, "the employer would
be regarding the individual as disabled and acting on the basis of that

perceived disability." 67 Similarly, HIV-positive individuals might be
perceived as incapable of functioning while, in fact, no symptoms of

the disease are yet manifested or inhibiting.68
The ADA Regulations specifically state that an employer would
be violating the ADA if an employer discharged an employee in response to an erroneous rumor that the employee tested HIV-positive. 69 Unfortunately, the ADA Regulations do not address the ques-

tion of whether an employee who is terminated because he or she is
in fact HIV-positive would satisfy the requirements of this section as

he or she may be completely qualified for the position but is considered to be substantially limited. The ADA Regulations direct, however, that an individual should not automatically be considered to have

a disability merely because he or she is diagnosed as HIV-positive,"
as this is an infection that may or may not result in an immediate
impairment." Such an individual is an individual with a disability
only if the impairment affects the individual to such a degree that it

substantially limits a major life activity.72 Accordingly, individuals

with AIDS or who are IRV-positive and who are physically affected
would appear to be covered under the Act.
The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act do, in fact, protect those
individuals who are not actually disabled but who are perceived as

being disabled. 73 An employee may be discriminated against based

66. ADA Guidelines, supra note 43, § 1630.2(1).
67. Id.
68. See Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E.2d 814, 817 (W. Va. 1990)
(holding that HIV infection severely limits individual's ability to "socialize," which the court
considered a major life activity under state regulations); Cerisse Anderson, Court Allows AIDS
Bias Claim, N.Y. LJ., Feb. 22, 1991, at 1 (stating proof that employee has AIDS is not a
prerequisite for discrimination suit if action is based on employer's perception that claimant
has AIDS).
69. ADA Guidelines, supra note 43, § 1630.2(l). It was first recommended that AIDS
be considered a handicap under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See James F. Baxley, Rehabilitating AIDS-Based Employment Discrimination: HIV Infection as a Handicap Under the
Vocational Rehabilitation Act Of 1973, 19 SErON HALL L. REv. 23, 37-38 (1989).
70. See ADA Regulations, supra note 52, § 1630.2(g)-(h)(1), (i)-(j).
71. See David B. Ritter & Ronald Turner, AIDS: Employer Concerns and Options, 38
LAB. L.J. 67, 67 ("Current cases of AIDS have resulted from exposure to the virus that occurred up to seven years prior to diagnosis. The possibility of longer incubation periods has
not been excluded by the medical community.").
72. ADA Guidelines, supra note 43, § 1630.20).
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(c); 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B); Doe v. Centinela Hosp., No.
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on a positive response on an IV test, his or her receipt of medical
treatment, or his or her inclusion or perceived inclusion in a "highrisk" group. Any employee is protected from adverse employment
determination based on the employer's belief that the employee is
HIV-positive,74 notwithstanding the fact that she or he may not actually have the virus, or that the virus does not in fact render the employee impaired.
While the Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity to determine whether IV or AIDS is covered under the Act, the Court
determined in 1987 that a contagious disease may constitute a disability. In School Board v. Arline,75 the Court held that a school teacher
with tuberculosis was a handicapped person within the meaning of
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Although Arline did not directly
address the issue of HIV, the lower court did discuss contagious diseases such as tuberculosis or HIV in its opinion:
Neither the regulations nor the statutory language give any indication that chronic contagious diseases are to be excluded from the
definition of "handicap." To the extent that the statute and regulations express any intent to limit the scope of section 504, Congress'
failure to exclude contagious diseases from coverage when it specifically excluded alcoholism and drug abuse implies that it harbored
no similar disapproval about them. We would as a general matter be
reluctant to create an exemption where there is not a scintilla of
evidence that Congress had any intention of doing so. We are especially reluctant in a situation where, as here, identifying an exemption would free recipients of federal funds from any duty even to
consider whether reasonable accommodation could be made to those
afflicted with contagious diseases.76
Arline served as the basis for the district court's conclusion in
Cain v. Hyatt,77 in which the court held that the Pennsylvania statute
relating to discrimination in employment protected HIV-positive employees. Only time will evidence whether this holding is adopted
throughout the court system.
Other indications exist to support the conclusion that HIV and
AIDS are covered disabilities under the ADA. In 1986, the Depart-

CV 87-2514 PAR (PX), 1988 WL 81776, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 1988).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(c); 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B).

75. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
76.

Arline v. School Bd., 772 F.2d 759, 764 (11th Cir. 1985).

77. 734 F. Supp. 671, 679-80 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
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ment of Justice issued an opinion which stated that if the fear of
contagion is the basis for the termination, the employee is not considered disabled and is not protected under the Rehabilitation Act
because the ability to communicate the disease to another is not a
disability. 8 The opinion made no distinction based on whether the
fear of contagion is reasonable or unreasonable on the part of the
employer. However, because the Departmeni of Justice's opinion was
in direct contravention of the Supreme Court's determination in Arline
(which specifically stated that chronic contagious diseases are considered to be protected disabilities), it issued a second memorandum
which reversed its earlier analysis, stating that the federal definition
of a handicapped person does include HIV-positive asymptomatic carriers, and individuals with AIDS. 79 Therefore, it is the opinion of the
Department of Justice that even asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals are considered "disabled" pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act and
employers may not discriminate against them as long as they are otherwise qualified to perform their jobs, with or without reasonable accommodation. 8"
Taking a direct step to avoid such discrimination, the ADA provides that an employer should not terminate or refuse to hire an employee with a disability who is "otherwise qualified" for the position. 8 An otherwise qualified individual is one who remains able to
perform the essential requirements of her or his position, with or
without reasonable accommodations. 82 As stated in the regulations
implementing sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, "inclusion of the phrase [essential functions] is useful in emphasizing that
handicapped persons should not be disqualified simply because they
may have difficulty in performing tasks that bear only a marginal
relationship to a particular job." 83 "Essential" has now taken on a
meaning similar to "business necessity. '
78. Application of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to Persons with AIDS, AIDSRelated Complex, or Infection with the AIDS Virus, Memorandum of the U.S. Dep't of Justice, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 122, at D-1 (June 20, 1986); see Michael S. Cecere,
Working with AIDS, 16 THE BRIEF 6, 8 (1987).
79. Application of Rehabilitation Act's Section 504 to HIV-Infected Individuals, Memorandum of the U.S. Dep't of Justice, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 195, at D-1 (Oct. 7, 1988).
80. See Chai R. Feldblum, Employment Requirements, in THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: PLANNING FOR COMPLIANCE, 23, 23-54 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 412, 1991).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
82. Id.
83. 45 Fed. Reg. 63,284 (1980) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 18).
84. "Business necessity" is a term frequently used in connection with discrimination ac-
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A district court evaluated the ability of the employee to perform
the functional requirements of his position in Dexler v. Tisch.85 In
that case, the district court held that an employment applicant who
suffered from achondroplastic dwarfism was unable to do many of the
tasks required by the position for which he applied.86 This prevented

him. from being qualified for the job. Since, under the Rehabilitation
Act, the employer must reasonably accommodate only those applicants
who are 6therwise qualified, the court held that accommodation in
this case was not required and, further, would unduly interfere with
the workings of the potential employer, a post office.87 As is evidenced by this case, the definition of the essential position requirements is determinative; therefore, it is that definition that will be

carefully scrutinized by the court.
The definition of "otherwise qualified" was also addressed by the

Supreme Court in Arline.88 The Court held that the determination
should be made based on the nature of risk (how the disease is transmitted); the duration of the risk (how long the carrier is infectious);
the severity of the risk (potential harm to third parties); and the probability that the disease will be transmitted and will cause harm. 89
Legal scholars as well as courts have either interpreted the Supreme
Court's decision in Arline as a directive that the protection of the

Rehabilitation Act safeguards the rights of employees with HIV or

tions. The plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination pursuant to Title VII. After the plaintiff has satisfied this requirement, the burden then
shifts to the employer who may rebut that showing by articulating that a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") exists which is not met by the plaintiff. If the court finds that
this requirement is bona fide, or of business necessity, the burden returns to the plaintiff to
prove that the BFOQ is pretextual. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Americans with Disabilities Act's definition of
"essential functions" incorporates this concept in that only those functions which are actually
required of someone in the employee's position are deemed to be essential. Those functions
which are not bona fide requirements, or not of business necessity, need not be met by the
disabled employee. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
85. 660 F. Supp. 1418 (D. Conn. 1987).
86. Id. at 1422.
87. Id. at 1425-26; see also Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 471 F. Supp.
119, 121-22 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (holding that plaintiff was not qualified for lifting position
where he suffered from muscle and nerve deterioration and had a weakness in his hands
which prevented him from lifting items of sixty pounds or more on a regular basis), affd on
other grounds, 620 F.2d 672 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980).
88. 480 U.S. at 285-89.
89. Id. at 288. In connection with the concept of a direct threat of transmission, see
also ADA Regulations, supra note 52, § 1630.2(r).
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predicted that that would be the effect.90 In one case, for example,
the trier of fact determined that an employee with AIDS was discriminated against on the basis of disability when he was fired merely
because he had AIDS. 9 The basis for the decision was that his condition fell within the plain meaning of the Rehabilitation Act term

"handicapped." '92 As defined by previous cases, a handicapped person
"does not enjoy, in some manner, the full and normal use of his sensory, mental, or physical faculties." 93
In yet another related decision applying section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Local 1812, American Federation of Government Employees v. United States Department of State,94 a District of Columbia court held that HIV-infected foreign service employees were not
"otherwise qualified" for worldwide duty based on the fact that IVinfected individuals would be subject to poor medical care and unsan-

itary conditions at many posts, and that these conditions may endanger the health of the employee due to their heightened risk of infection.9" Therefore, the HIV-positive employees and applicants were
restricted to positions where adequate health and medical services
could be maintained. The court said that the Rehabilitation Act did
not require the State Department to ignore the obvious relevance of
IV to the job qualifications. 96 Additionally, the court held that "any
further accommodation would require the State Department fundamen-

90. See, e.g., Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1502, 1506 (1lth Cir. 1988) (basing its
analysis of "handicapped" on Arline, the court determined that plaintiff with AIDS is handicapped and therefore protected by Rehabilitation Act); Chalk v. United States Dist. Court
Cent. Dist., 840 F.2d 701, 708-09 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that there was a strong probability
of success on the merits where HIV-positive school teacher claimed coverage of the Rehabilitation Act as a handicapped person); Baxter v. Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 729 (S.D. Ill.
1989) (basing its decision on Arline, the court concluded that AIDS is a disability under the
Illinois Fair Housing Act, which was modeled on the Rehabilitation Act); Cronan v. New
England Tel. Co., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1273 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1986); District 27
Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Cecere,
supra note 78, at 6; Larry Gostin & Andrew Ziegler, A Review of AIDS-Related Legislative
and Regulatory Policy in the United States, 15 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 5 (1987).
91. Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 639 F. Supp. 654, 656 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (the Florida Commission of Human Rights determined that the defendant had been unlawfully terminated because he had AIDS).
92. See id.
93. Chicago, Mil., St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 557
P.2d 307, 309-10 (1977) (en banc) (finding discrimination where railroad refused to hire an
applicant who had previously undergone knee surgery).
94. 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987).
95. Id. at 52-53.
96. Id. at 54.
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tally to alter its medical fitness program[] . . . or to incur an undue
financial burden in upgrading medical care services."'97 The essence
of the holding is that the individuals with HIV were not "otherwise
qualified" for the jobs involved. This case exemplifies the limits of
the Rehabilitation Act as constrained by the terms "otherwise qualified" and "essential functions."
Until the Supreme Court issues a conclusive determination regarding the applicability of the ADA to individuals with HIV or
AIDS, lower courts will continue to struggle with the EEOC regulations and definitive statements made by that office and the Department of Justice. However, the case law appears to suggest that there
is no correct conclusion but that HIV-positive employees will be considered disabled as defined by the ADA. But the question remains as
to the extent of the protection that will be provided.
I.

REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION OF HIV-INFECTED EMPLOYEES

A.

Types of Reasonable Accommodation

Once it has been determined that an individual is disabled and
otherwise qualified, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act affirmatively
require the employer to make reasonable accommodations to the
known disabilities of applicants and employees.9" The primary issue
of concern to employers, naturally, is the interpretation of "reasonable." The ADA lists many important accommodations that must be
considered in making employment decisions.9 9 The ADA states that
reasonable accommodations may include but are not limited to:
[M]aking facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; .

.

. and job restructuring, part-

time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate
adjustment or modification of examinations, training materials or
policies, the provision of readers or interpreters, and other similar
accommodations for individuals with disabilities.'O
"Reasonable accommodation" as explained by the EEOC includes
any modification or adjustment that enables a qualified individual

97. Id. at 54 n.7.

98. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 706.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 12111.
100. I § 12111(9).
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with a disability to 1) be considered for the position such qualified
individual desires, 2) perform the essential functions of that position,
or 3) enjoy the same benefits and privileges of employment as are
enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without disabilities,
and which will not impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
covered entity's business."' 1
The accommodations listed as reasonable accommodations in the
ADA itself are generally self-explanatory. However, there are a few
that require further explanation. One of these is the accommodation of
making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to, and
usable by, individuals with disabilities. This accommodation includes
those areas that must be accessible for employees to perform essential
job functions, as well as non-work areas used by the employees for
other purposes. For example, access to break rooms, lunch rooms,
training rooms,
or rest rooms may be required as reasonable accom02
modations.
A clear example of this type of reasonable accommodation that
must be made is adapting work space to accomodate wheelchairs. If
an employer has two applicants for an open position, one who requires the use of a wheelchair and another who has no disability, the
employer may not choose the individual without a disability solely
because of the need to modify the work space for the other applicant.
One potentially dramatic reasonable accommodation contemplated
by the ADA is "job restructuring."'0 3 "Job restructuring" simply entails the modification of a job by removing barriers to its performance
by limiting non-essential functions, for example, or by exchanging
assignments with other employees.1°4 An employer is not required
to alter or reallocate essential functions of the job.10 By definition,
the essential functions are those that the individual who holds the job
would have to perform with or without reasonable accommodation in
order to be considered qualified for the position." 6
Reassignment is another potential reasonable accommodation. 7
Although the concept of reassignment is relatively self-explanatory,
the ADA and its regulations have limited the concept to a certain

101.
102.
103.
104.

ADA Regulations, supra note 52, § 1630.2(o).
ADA Guidelines, supra note 43, § 1630.2(o).
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
ADA Guidelines, supra note 43, § 1630.2(o).

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
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extent. The ADA Regulations point out that reassignment is not available to all applicants." 8 An applicant for a position must be qualified for, and be able to perform the essential functions of, the position sought, with or without reasonable accommodations. 0 9
Reassignment is only to be considered where the individual can
be reassigned to a currently vacant position or a position that will
become vacant within a reasonable amount of time."0 Therefore,
"bumping" another employee to create a vacancy is not required. Further, the employer is not required to promote an individual with a
disability as an accommodation."' However, an employer may reassign an individual to a lower graded position if there are no accommodations that will enable the employee to remain in the current position and there are no vacant equivalent positions for which the individual is qualified." 2
Part-time or modified work schedules may be an inexpensive
form of accommodation. Though the ADA does not require an employer to provide disabled employees with more paid leave time than
it provides to non-disabled employees, reasonable accommodations
may include providing additional unpaid leave days.' The ADA
Guidelines specifically provide that accommodations may include permitting the use of accrued paid leave or providing additional unpaid
4
leave for necessary medical treatment."
In various cases addressing the type of accommodation required
for such persons under the Rehabilitation Act, courts have stated that
the requirement of reasonable accommodation does not compel the
creation of a new job, nor the modification of a full-time position in
order to create a part-time position, a modification of the essential
functions of the job, or reassignment.' Reassignment would only

108. ADA Guidelines, supra note 43, § 1630.2(o).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1250-51 (6th Cir.
1985) (holding that Postal Service is not required to accommodate plaintiff by eliminating one
of the essential functions of his job because § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act imposes no
requirement to lower or to effect substantial modifications of standards to accommodate a
handicapped person); Dancy v. Kline, 639 F. Supp. 1076, 1080-81 (N.D. Iil. 1986) (holding
that "reasonable accommodation" refers to making the job for which a handicapped person

was hired, and not another job, accessible to handicapped persons, and qualifying "position in
question" so as not to include all positions to which a handicapped employee may be reas-
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be required where the employer has an existing policy regarding reassignments, 1 6 and is not available to an applicant for a specific position.' 17 As the court stated in Arline, "[a]lthough [the employer is]
not required to find another job for an employee who is not qualified
for the job he or she was doing, [it] cannot deny an employee alternative employment opportunities reasonably available under the
employer's existing policies.""' 8 In another case decided under the
Rehabilitation Act, an air traffic control specialist with a hearing
problem requested a transfer to the position of information specialist,
which had no restrictive hearing requirements." 9 The court found
that the defendant-employer failed to meet its burden of providing a
reasonable accommodation of the plaintiff's handicap.120 The court
found that, while a transfer seemed unnecessary and burdensome, the
defendant should have suggested "reasonable accommodations, such as
hearing aids . . . , and test[ed] plaintiff's performance with them. If
plaintiff cannot perform adequately without a compensatory device
and refuses to use one then the agency will have fulfilled its responsibility to plaintiff."''
Other section 504 cases have held that an accommodation need
not be the best possible solution, but need only be sufficient to meet
the needs of the individual with the disability.' 22 While the accommodations enumerated may not be what the employee would consider
the best option, they satisfy the employer's duty under the Rehabilitation Act. Furthermore, once an employer offers an accommodation
that would allow the employee to adequately perform the requirements of the position, the employee must either accept that accommodation or discontinue working.'23
An employee with AIDS may be unable to maintain consistent

signed).
116. See Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467 (4th Cir. 1987) (ruling that Postal Service
was not required to accommodate custodian by assigning him to permanent light duty where
Service did not normally assign permanent light duty to employees who had served less than
five years).
117. ADA Guidelines, supra note 43, § 1630.2(o).
118. 480 U.S. at 289 n.19.
119. Crane v. Lewis, 551 F. Supp. 27, 28 (D.D.C. 1982).
120. Id. at 31.
121. Id. at 31-32.
122. See ADA Guidelines, supra note 43, § 1630.9.
123. ADA Regulations, supra note 52, § 1630.9(d); see also Butler v. Department of the
Navy, 595 F. Supp. 1063, 1067-68 (D. Md. 1984).
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24
stamina or a high degree of effort throughout an entire workday.'
HIV-positive individuals have a much lower resistance to infection or
viruses and therefore may require an accommodation in order to prevent further exposure to health hazards. There are numerous ways to
accommodate these individuals, some of which are more burdensome
for the employer than others. While the reasonableness of the request
depends on the factual circumstances presented by each case, the accommodations that might be necessitated by an employee with HIV
may include job reassignments to positions which require less physical exertion, flexible or reduced hours, lower salary for reduced job
demands, work-at-home arrangements, more breaks, use of labor-saving equipment, or positions with no physical contact. Additionally,
employees with HIV or AIDS may further require the use of accrued
paid leave or additional unpaid leave in order to visit a doctor.

B.

Confidentiality

An employee with HIV or AIDS may also require the accommodation of confidentiality regarding information not previously treated
by the employer as requiring confidentiality. Whether the employee
will demand confidentiality will depend on the type of position and
other personal factors. As stated by Justice Louis Brandeis, the right
to privacy is "the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men."' 125 Ithas been
suggested that, after health care, privacy in the workplace may be the
most important social issue in the 1990S.126 An individual may hesitate to come forward in order to receive adequate testing, counseling,
and treatment unless his or her employer agrees to maintain that
employee's confidence related to the disease. 27 In certain employment environments, this request may necessitate a small accommodation of the employer's regulations regarding access to medical and
other personal information. The mere presence of an HIV infection
should not affect the actual day-to-day affairs of the company.
Twenty-seven states have taken a direct approach to this issue by
codifying the requirement that test results be kept confidential. 2 To
124. See supra note 3.
125. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
126. John Hoerr, Privacy, Bus. WK., March 28, 1988, at 61.
127. Gostin & Ziegler, supra note 90, at 13.
128. See AIDS IN THE WORKPLACE 14 (CCH ed., 1990); see, e.g., CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 199.21 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-1009
(1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-F:8(II) (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-IOA-I (Michie
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illustrate, in Massachusetts an employee was forced to inform his
supervisor of the reason for a medical examination. 2 9 After having
been told that the employee visited his doctor because he had AIDS,
the supervisor informed the employee's co-workers of the employee's
condition. The employee thereafter received threats to his life from
those co-workers. The court upheld a cause of action for disability
discrimination and invasion of privacy pursuant to that state's human
rights act, as well as a violation of civil rights against 130the employer
for its failure to protect the employee from this assault.
If an employer learns that an employee has contracted AIDS, the
next step is to evaluate the necessity of informing the employee's coworkers. This evaluation requires that personal privacy be weighed
against public good. Disclosure of medical information regarding an
employee may violate that employee's right to privacy and subject the
employer to substantial tort liability. As stated above, many states
have enacted legislation specifically requiring confidentiality of test
results. These state statutes differ from the federal statutes mentioned
above as they do not concern only the employment arena; the state
laws identify those individuals who may be privy to the data and
those who may not have access.
However, at least one federal court has held that an employee's
right to privacy in public sector employment is not violated by the
failure of his employer to maintain the confidentiality of his positive
HIV test results.' While these evaluations certainly are not easy
for employers or infected individuals, carelessness on the part of the
employer can expose him or her to liability.'
C. Contact Positions
Depending on the progress of the employee's infection, some
accommodation of the employee may be required to eliminate the risk
of communicating the disease to others. Thus the need for accommodation would only arise if the individual's position involved the kind

1991).
129. Cronan v. New England Tel. Co., 41 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1273, 1273
(Mass. Super. Ct. 1986).
130. Id. at 1274-77.
131. Plowman v. United States Dep't of the Army, 698 F. Supp. 627, 632 (E.D. Va.
1988) (stating that the right to privacy regarding an employee's medical condition is "neither

clearly established nor absolute").
132. For a discussion of the employer's potential liability for transmission of the virus to
other co-workers, see infra notes 192-230 and accompanying text.
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of physical contact with others that could potentially transmit the
infection. 33 In evaluating the employer's responsibility to provide
this accommodation, the employer must consider whether the accommodation would actually eliminate the risk to others and whether the
employee, with the accommodation, will be able to function adequately.'34 Specifically, "[a] person who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others in the workplace will not
be otherwise qualified for his or her job if reasonable accommodation
will not eliminate that risk."'35 Therefore, to be otherwise qualified
for a particular position, an employee must not put co-workers at risk
of contracting a disease.
Transmission of HIV and AIDS in the workplace was forced to
the forefront by the media recently when it seized upon the stories of
various HIV-infected physicians, dentists. and others in "contact positions. ' ' 116 A New Jersey court ruled that "the patient's rights must
prevail" when faced with a case involving an AIDS-infected surgeon.'3 7 The court balanced the right to informed consent, which
requires that a patient be informed of all risks concomitant with medical treatment, with the doctor's right to protection from discrimination as a disabled individual under New Jersey law, including the
invasion of privacy based on the disability. 38 The Centers for Disease Control have recommended that each doctor reach his or her
own decision regarding whether to inform the patient, based upon his
or her own professional judgment.'3 9 The American Medical Association (the "AMA") has echoed this position, and in its support has
refused to prepare a list of those procedures which may be considered
sufficiently invasive as to require medical personnel to disclose their
HIV status.' 4
In addition, a doctor should not be required to disclose his or

133. See Kelly & Aalberts, supra note 13, at 675-76.
134. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1987).
135. Id. at 287 n.16.
136. See, e.g., Marlene Cimons, Report Raises Questions About Dentist's Role in HIV
Infections, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1993, at 21, pt. A, col. 5; MD with AIDS Sues, N.Y.
NEwSDAY, Nov. 25, 1992, at 16.
137. Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1283 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991);
see also Linda Campbell, Complex AIDS Debate: Doctor Disclosure. CHI. TRIB., May 3,
1991, § 1, at 1.
138. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 to -42 (West 1993).
139. Campbell, supra note 137, at 1.
140. See Marlene Cimons, Doctors Flout CDC Curbs on Physicians with AIDS, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 1991, at 1, pt. A, col. 1.
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her HIV infection to a patient because similar disclosure of other serious diseases with significantly higher risks of transmission is not
required. It is persuasive to note that the Centers for Disease Control
has estimated that the risk of contracting the HIV infection from a
dentist ranges from 1 in 260,000 to 1 in 2,600,000, and from a surgeon, 1 in 41,667 to 1 in 416,667; t"' the risk of getting Hepatitis B
from a doctor ranges from 1 in 417 to 1 in 4167.142 In fact, of
182,000 Americans with AIDS in the past ten years, "only five are
thought to have contracted the virus from a practicing health care
professional."1 43 In those situations, however, there is no evidence
that the infection was transmitted by a health care worker-the infection may have instead been transmitted through the use of unclean
instruments infected by other patients. While even one death or malady as a result of HIV transmission from a health care provider is
unacceptable, it must be noted that the risk of contracting many other
diseases is radically higher than that of contracting HIV.
D.

"Undue Hardship"

While the duty to provide reasonable accommodations can be
immense, the employer must only provide these accommodations if
their provision can be accomplished without undue hardship on the
employer. 44 As one commentator wrote, "'reasonable accommodation' is but one side of the coin; 'undue hardship' . . . is the
other side."' 45 Therefore, courts must look not only to the type of
accommodation requested but to the effect of that accommodation on
the employer.' 46

141. See Jeff Vendsel, HIV-Testing Guidelines May Put Hospitals in a Dilemma, THE
RECORDER, Mar. 6. 1991, at 1.

142. Id.
143.

Cracking Down on Doctors with AIDS, NEWSWEEK, July 29, 1991, at 47.

144. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a); see Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,
413 (1979) (holding that defendant employer's unwillingness to make major adjustments in its
nursing program did not constitute discrimination because undue hardship would be suffered
by the defendant as a result of such accommodation); Simon v. St. Louis County, 735 F.2d
1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that requirements for police officers were reasonable,
legitimate, and necessary requirements for all positions within the department, and thus modification of such requirements would constitute an undue hardship on defendant employer).
145. JONES, DAY, REAVIS & POGUE, TITLE I OF THE AMERICANS wrrIH DISABILIIEs ACr

31 (1991).
146. ADA Regulations, supra note 52, § 1630.9(a); see also Davis v. United States Postal Serv., 675 F. Supp. 225, 236 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (stating that employer is not required to
violate its existing contractual arrangements by offering reassignment to disabled employee
who was otherwise unqualified for reassignment).
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Defining undue hardship is essential to an employer's determination regarding which actions it must take to avoid liability. The ADA

defines undue hardship as "an action requiring significant difficulty or
expense."' 47 But the determination goes beyond a consideration of
the actual financial expenditure and resources of the employer. The
impact of the accommodation on the operation of the facility must

also be considered, including the impact on the ability of other employees to perform their duties and the impact on the facility's abilify
to conduct business.148 In addition, the ADA Guidelines suggest
that, where the cost of the accommodation would result in an undue
hardship and outside funding is not available from assistance organi-

zations or other federal agencies, the individual with a disability
should be given the option of
paying the portion of the cost that
149
hardship.
undue
an
constitutes
The first case to address HIV-infected employees since the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act was Cain v. Hyatt.5t 0 Pursuant to

Pennsylvania's Human Relations Act,' 5 ' the state's version of the
Rehabilitation Act, an employee brought a cause of action against his
employer for failure to accommodate his disability. The court held
that the employer had a duty to accommodate the infected employee
in three manners: (1) by not terminating him during his first AIDS

hospitalization; (2) by permitting him to take his sick and vacation
days at that time; and (3) to place him on medical leave until he
could return to his job or until the employer could prove that the
situation imposed an undue hardship.'52 These requirements effec-

tively balance accommodating a disabled individual and preventing

147. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A). The Act sets out four factors that are to be considered
when determining whether or not an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on an
employer: (1) the nature and cost of the accommodation; (2) the overall financial resources of
the facility involved in providing the reasonable accommodation, the number of persons
employed at such facility, the effect on its expenses and resources, or the impact of such
accommodation upon the operation of that facility; (3) the overall financial resources of the
covered entity, overall size of the covered business entity, with respect to the number of its
employees, and the number, type, and location of its facilities; and (4) the type of operation
of the covered entity, including the compensation, structure, and functions of the work force
of such entity; geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or
facilities in question of the covered entity. Id. § 12111(10)(B).
148. ADA Regulations, supra note 52, § 1630.2(p)(2)(v).
149. ADA Guidelines, supra note 43, § 1630.2(p).
150. 734 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
151. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955 (Supp. 1992) (Act is modelled upon and follows
Rehabilitation Act definitions).
152. Cain, 734 F. Supp. at 683.
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discrimination with the potential for undue hardship imposed on employers.
The ADA Guidelines suggest that undue hardship is not limited
to financial concerns, but may also include any accommodation that
would be "unduly ... extensive, substantial or disruptive, or that
would fundamentally alter the nature or operation of the business."' 153 For example, even though the plaintiff in Dexler v.
Tisch"s was deemed unqualified by the court for the position for
which he applied, the court evaluated the applicant's accommodation
request using the above framework. 5 5 This determination was a result of the court's obligation to first determine if the applicant was
qualified with an accommodation, then to evaluate whether the accommodation was unduly burdensome on the employer. The court addressed the various accommodations proposed by the applicant, including the use of a step stool, the use of a platform, and job restructuring. Based upon the operations of the employer as a post office,
the court held that job restructuring was not a possible alternative
since such restructuring would often leave the plaintiff without work
to do, which the court held was an undue burden. 5 6 In addition,
the court found that the nature and the costs of the proposed accommodations also constituted an undue hardship. The stool or platform
was not considered appropriate as the court found that either would
cause safety problems and a loss of efficiency.' 57 Therefore, the
court held that failure to hire the individual was not a violation of the
Rehabilitation Act.
Employers may also attempt to show that the adverse employment action was based on their fears relating to future absences or
potentially higher insurance costs, which constitute an undue hardship.'58 Courts, however, have not accepted this concern over possible future costs as a defense to a claim of discrimination.' 5 9 In ad-

153. ADA Guidelines, supra note 43, § 1630.2(p).
154. 660 F. Supp. 1418 (D. Conn. 1987).
155. Id. at 1427-29.
156. Id. at 1428; see also Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910, 927-28 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(holding that the Postal Service was not under a duty to accommodate plaintiff who suffered
from uncontrolled hypertension as the necessary accommodation would have imposed upon
the post office an undue hardship).
157. Dexler, 660 F. Supp. at 1428.
158. The average annual health care cost per AIDS-infected employee is estimated to
range from $20,320 to $33,842. Bay Area Study by Economists Shows Lower Costs for Some
Patients, 2 AIDS Pol'y and Law (BNA) No. 20, at 2 (Oct. 21, 1987).
159. See Cain v. Hyatt. 734 F. Supp. 671, 681 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (stating that an
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dition, speculation regarding possible higher costs of health care and

insurance are unfounded in connection with individuals who are HIVpositive but who have not yet developed AIDS. While it is probable
that the individual will develop AIDS, there remain individuals today

who have been HIV-positive for some time but have not yet developed AIDS.' 60
In a case evaluating an employer's concern that an obese employee would cost the employer more in the future in connection with
health care, the New York Court of Appeals held that this was not a
valid defense even though obese people, as a class, are at a greater
risk for certain health problems than others. 61 The court explained

this result by stating that employment can only be refused if the62
condition is related to the performance of the position's duties.'

Defenses based on nothing more than an employer's fears and speculations about the possible collateral effects of an applicant's disability
will not succeed against charges of discrimination.
Not only must the undue hardship be more than speculative, but
6s
the ADA requires more than a de minimis expense,' such as that
required by Title VII, 6' because of the nature of the discrimination
against disabled individuals and the possibilities for the removal of

artificial barriers to employment. While the type, and accompanying
expense, of accommodations will vary with each case, it is generally
employer's fears, well founded or not, concerning the future performance of an employee or
applicant who is presently able to discharge the functions of the position do not justify adverse employment actions, unless the safety of that person or others is implicated); see also
Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1014-15 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (holding that termination of employee to avoid economic consequences that would result from plaintiff's continued
participation in employer-funded medical plans was unlawful); State Div. of Human Rights ex
rel. McDermott v. Xerox Corp., 480 N.E.2d 695, 697 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that employment
may not be denied on the basis of any actual or perceived undesirable effect the person's
employment may have on disability or life insurance programs); see generally Comment, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: Analyzing Employment Discrimination Claims, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 867, 884-91 (1984).
160. See supra note 71.
161. McDermott, 480 N.E.2d at 698-99.
162. Id. at 697-98.
163. ADA Guidelines, supra note 43, § 1630.15(d) ('To demonstrate 'undue hardship'
pursuant to the ADA . .. an employer must show substantially more difficulty or expense
than would be needed to satisfy the 'de minimis' Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act] standard
of undue hardship.").
164. 'While the Supreme Court, in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63
(1977), held that an employer need not suffer more than a de minimis expense in order to
reasonably accommodate a religious practice under Title VII, courts have consistently held
that this low standard does not apply to claims of handicap discrimination. See, e.g., Prewitt
v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 308 n.22 (5th Cir. 1981).
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believed that the average accommodation expense is normally quite
low, approximately $261 per disabled employee. t65 In addition, employees with HIV or AIDS may require the use of accrued paid leave
in order to visit their physician. It would be difficult for many employers to prove that these intermittent departures constitute an undue
hardship or financial hardship.1 66 Therefore, few employers will be
successful in asserting a defense that the expense is too great. The
Ninth Circuit specifically rejected this argument in Bentivegna v.
United States Department of Labor,167 stating:
[A]llowing remote concerns to legitimize discrimination against the
handicapped would vitiate the effectiveness of section 504 of the
Act. Potentially troublesome health problems will affect a large proportion of the handicapped population. Consistent attendance and an
expectation of continuity will be important to any employer. Such
considerations cannot provide the basis for discriminatory job qualifications unless they can be connected directly to "business necessity
168
or safe performance of the job."'
E. Other Defenses
Under the Rehabilitation Act, the employer could also rebut an
employee's claim of discrimination for failure to provide reasonable
accommodation based on termination if it could show that the infected employee poses a reasonable probability of substantial harm to
others. 169 The Rehabilitation Act defines an "otherwise qualified" disabled employee as one who, "with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position in question
without
endangering the health and safety of the individual or oth''
ers.
~
es"170
The standard for balancing the risk of harm to others against the
employer's duties under the Rehabilitation Act was articulated in

165. Equal Employment Opportunity For Individuals With Disabilities, Supplementary Information, 56 Fed. Reg. 8578, 8583-84 (1991) (using average of several statistical studies to
predict the net economic effect of accommodation expenses to be $261 per individual as a
result of the reasonable accommodations requirement of Title I of the ADA).
166. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that refusal to grant leave for in-patient treatment of alcohol abuse violated requirement of reasonable accommodation).
167. 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982).

168. Id. at 623.
169. Cecere, supra note 78, at 8, 10-11.
170. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(a)(6) (1992).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1993

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:561

Mantolete v. Bolger.' There the court held that in order to refuse
employment to a disabled individual, the employer must show that
there is a reasonable probability of substantial injury to the potential
employee or others. 72 As it has been shown that HIV is not transmitted through casual contact, but only through intimate contact,'73
"it seems unlikely that a showing of reasonable probability of [infection] . .. can be made." 74 Therefore, employers who take adverse
employment actions based on the unreasonable complaints or fears of
co-employees or customers would violate the Rehabilitation Act.
This rejection of unreasonable fear as the basis for discrimination
was further supported by the Ninth Circuit in Chalk v. United States
District Court Central District.75 In that case, a teacher was removed from his classroom based on the fact that he had contracted
AIDS. 17 6 The court held that the possibility that the plaintiffs return to the classroom would produce fear and apprehension in parents
was insufficient grounds on which to deny a preliminary
and students
t77
injunction.
To allow the court to base its decision on the fear and apprehension
of others would frustrate the goals of section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act]. "[Tihe Basic purpose of § 504 [is] to ensure that disabled
individuals are not denied jobs or other benefits because of the
prejudiced attitudes or ignorance of others."' 78
This decision is directly in line with the Supreme Court's decision in Arline, which rejected the argument that exclusion of the disabled individual from opportunities could be justified on the basis of
"pernicious mythologies" or "irrational fears.' 7 9 In Cain, the court

171. 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985).
172. Id. at 1422-23.
173. Recommendations for the Workplace, supra note 17, at 682; see also LaRocca v.
Dalsheim, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302, 307 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (citing support for view that infection
through casual contact offers "little or no risk").
174. Cecere, supra note 78, at 11; see also Crawford v. Industrial Comm'n, 534 P.2d
1077, 1082 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that "there must be a causal connection with the
employment, and not a mere coincidental connection, and there must be a clearly established
facet of special exposure in excess of the 'commonalty"').
175. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
176. Id. at 703.
177. Id. at 710-11.
178. Id. at 711 (quoting School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987)) (alterations in

original).
179. Arline, 480 U.S. at 284; see also Ray v. School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1535
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held that "the asserted reticence or unwillingness of co-workers and
clients to associate with an AIDS victim who is without any contagious opportunistic infections does not convert a handicap into a jobrelated one." 80 It is just such attitudes and prejudices that tread upon the rights of infected individuals.
The ADA definition of "qualified individual with a disability'' indicates a similar effort to protect the rights of the disabled
employee in this regard. The ADA definition omits the words of the
Rehabilitation Act, "without endangering the health and safety of the
individual or others."' 82 In lieu of this provision, the ADA specifies
that qualification standards for any given position "may include a
requirement that an individual ... not pose a direct threat to the
health and safety of other individuals in the workplace."' 8 3 "Direct
threat" imposes a much more stringent standard than the Rehabilitation Act's standard of "endangerment." The ADA Regulations define
the term as "a significant risk of substantial harm ... that cannot be
eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation."'' " The existence of a mere reasonable possibility of harm is insufficient.
It is undisputed that there remain certain employment contexts in
which an employer's claim that an HIV-infected individual was legitimately fired for safety reasons is likely to succeed. The employer
may be able to show that, based on a bona fide occupational qualification (a "BFOQ") for the position, there is a direct threat of substantial harm if the individual is hired or maintained. A BFOQ is an
assertion by the defendant-employer that the position requirement
which the employer claims is not satisfied by the disabled individual
is a "bona fide" requirement of the position, and not one articulated
merely for the purpose of discriminating against that individual."'
For instance, an employee in a medical institution poses a more likely
risk to the individuals with whom he or she comes into contact than
does an electrician. If an employee's position subjects him or her to a

(M.D. Fla. 1987); Jansen v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 541 A.2d 682, 687 (N.J. 1988).
180. Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 681 (E.D. Pa. 1990); see also Rucker v. Higher
Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that the refusal to hire an
individual because of the preferences of co-workers, the employer, customers, or clients is not
permissible under Title VII); cf. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. pt.
1604, § 1604.1(iii) (1992).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
182. Compare id. § 12111(8) with 29 U.S.C. § 706(8).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
184. ADA Regulations, supra note 52, § 1630.2(r).

185. See id. § 1630.10.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1993

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:561

large number of abrasions, the employer may be held liable for negli-

gent hiring or maintaining of an employee with HIV.
Health care professionals find themselves on both sides of this

issue. A health care institution has the obligation to protect its employees from the transmission of HIV from one of their patients, as
well as the obligation to the patients to protect them from the transmission of HIV from one of its employees. In order to safeguard all
involved, health care institutions have established regulations related

to the handling of blood and other bodily fluids, as well as invasive
medical apparatus. 86 In fact, the Department of Justice has proposed that there should be no obligation to accommodate those health
care employees who engage in invasive surgical procedures.' 87 However, the Centers for Disease Control recommend that infected health
care workers should not be routinely restricted from performing these
procedures, but that a determination should be made based on the
individual circumstances of each case.' 83 Nevertheless, an employer
in any type of business may also be subject to a cause of action if

the employer has knowledge relating to the medical condition of an
employee, yet fails to adequately protect other employees. However, it
should be noted that the employer may be able to reduce the risk by

reasonable accommodation (i.e., job modification) rather then termination.
If no reasonable accommodation is possible or if the accommo-

186. Helen Creighton, Legal Aspects of AIDS-Part 11, NURSING MGMT., Dec. 1986, at
14, 14.
187. Justice Department Memorandum on Application of Rehabilitation Act's Section 504
to HIV-Infected Individuals, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 195, at D-1, D-5 to D-7 (Oct. 7,
1988).
188. Centers For Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings, 36 MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 3S. at 15S-16S (1987) [hereinafter Recommendations for Health-Care
Settings]. Note that the most recent compilation of recommendations from the Centers for
Disease Control relating to the transmission of HIV during invasive procedures states that
infected health care workers who adhere to universal precautions and who do not perform
invasive procedures pose no risk for transmitting HIV or the Hepatitis B virus to patients.
Infected health care workers who adhere to universal precautions and who perform certain
exposure-prone procedures pose a small risk for transmitting Hepatitis B virus to patients.
HIV is transmitted less readily than the Hepatitis B virus. Centers for Disease Control, U.S.
Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepititis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive
Procedures, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP., July 12, 1991, at 1. The CDC further
recommends that "[Health care workers] whose practices are modified because of their HIV
or HBV infection status should, whenever possible, be provided opportunities to continue
appropriate patient-care activities." Id. at 6.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol21/iss3/1

30

Pincus: The Americans with Disabilities Act: Employers' New Responsibilit
EMPLOYERS' NEW RESPONSIBILITIES

1993]

dation proposed causes an undue hardship on the employer, the employer may discharge the employee with impunity.'89 However, if
the employer claims that the employee cannot be accommodated or
no accommodation is reasonable, the employer must show that "the
employee's performance has deteriorated below minimum standards
and that 'reasonable accommodation' was made for the employee's
handicap or would cause undue financial burden on the employer. '190 There are defenses available to employers who are charged
with discrimination that extends beyond one isolated case.
It may be a defense to a charge of disparate treatment ... that the
challenged action is justified by a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason [or] ...that an alleged application of qualification standards,
tests, or selection criteria that screens out or tends to screen out or
otherwise denies a job or benefit to an individual with a disability
has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished with reasonable accommodation ....191
F. Some Directionfor Employers
It is evident that some cohesive guidelines are necessary in order
to provide some direction to employers regarding the definition of
"reasonable accommodation." Under the Rehabilitation Act, courts
addressed many claims by alcoholic employees alleging a disability
due to their alcoholism. In relation to these claims, the courts established guidelines for federal agencies that were very tough on agency
employers. In Rodgers v. Lehman,1 92 the court established a fivestep directive for the benefit of federal agency employers dealing with
alcoholic employees:
1) If the employer suspects alcoholism, she must inform the employee of counselling services.
2) If the alcoholism continues, the employer must give the employee
a "firm choice" between treatment and discipline.
3) The employee must be permitted to participate in an outpatient

189. However, the employer should be vigilant to avoid liability pursuant to § 510 of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988), which
considers termination wrongful if it is based on the employee's use or anticipated use of em-

ployee medical benefits. Id.
190.
191.

Franklin & Robinson, supra note 27, at 121.
ADA Regulations, supra note 52, § 1630.15(a)-(b).

192. 869 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1989).
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treatment program.
4) If this is unsuccessful, the employee must be permitted to participate in an inpatient treatment program.
5) Only if the first four steps fail can the employer legally discharge the employee. 93
Discharge is a last resort; only after affirmative action has been taken
by the agency does it become a viable option. 94
In this way, non-agency employers were given the benefit of a
directive from the courts as to the proper means of handling such a
case under the Rehabilitation Act. The same is necessary for dealing
with HIV-infected employees under the ADA (for private employers)
and the Rehabilitation Act (for federal employers). It is expected that
the guidelines which the courts will establish in connection with HIV
claims under the ADA will include the factors set forth in Arline.
While the alcoholism cases are evidence that the courts will provide
employers with tough guidelines related to claims of disability discrimination, the courts may provide for lenient guidelines in order to
protect co-workers because lIV has the potential to create more of a
health risk to co-workers than does alcoholism. This determination
will depend on the state of the medical research. In the final analysis,
courts will need to balance the interests and rights of the employee
with the factors set forth in Arline on an individual, case-by-case basis.

The determination relating to the provision of reasonable accommodation comprises a three-step analysis.' 95 First, the employer
must determine whether the employee is "disabled" pursuant to the
ADA definition.' 96 AIDS is an apparent disability while a diagnosis
of HIV-positive may or may not be a disability. The diagnosis of
either AIDS or HIV-positive may also be perceived as a disability
which would provide for protection of the individual under the Act.
Second, the employer must determine whether the individual is "otherwise qualified" for the position. Can the employee perform the
essential requirements of his or her position, with or without accommodation? Third, the employer must determine whether the accommo-

193. Id. at 259.
194. Id.
195. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)-(10).
196. The term "disability" is defined as (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual, (2) a record of such
impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see also
supra notes 53-97 and accompanying text.
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dation that is necessary in order to allow the employee to perform his
or her job effectively is "reasonable." Would the accommodation
impose an undue hardship on the employer in terms of cost or the

compromise of the business environment? The accommodation must
be provided if the employer ascertains (1) that the employee is dis-

abled, (2) that, with or without reasonable accommodation, the employee is qualified, and (3) that the accommodation does not impose
an undue hardship.
IV. POTENTIAL LIABILTrY OF THE EMPLOYER FOR
TRANSMISSION AF7ER REASONABLY

ACCOMMODATING AN EMPLOYEE

The employer of an HIV-infected individual may be liable to co-

workers of the individual based on a variety of common law tort theories. While typically, an employee's sole remedy for workplace inju-

ry is workers' compensation1Y 9 the employer may be liable to its
employee for any intentional torts. The employer has not only a statu-

tory duty to provide a sdfe environment in which to work pursuant to
federal regulations, but also a similar common law duty to refrain

from committing an intentional wrong upon the employee. 98 One
manner in which such a tort may arise relates to the response of the
employer to the news that an employee has acquired the IRV infection. If the employer reacts by engaging in outrageous conduct that
causes the employee severe emotional distress, the employer would be

liable in tort.' 99 In addition, unwarranted invasions of privacy,
breaches of confidentiality, and defamation have been held to be bas-

es for actions against employers.20 A tortious invasion of privacy

197. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 138.5(a), 138.11 (1991). In addition, the
workers' compensation remedy is only available to plaintiffs who can show that a disease is
work-related and not a disease to which the general public is exposed. See, e.g., Workers'
Occupational Diseases Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 172.36(d) (1991); Stewart Warner
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 33 N.E.2d 196, 198 (Il1. 1941) (superseded by statute as stated
in General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 454 N.E.2d 643 (Ill. 1983)).
198. See W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 80,
at 568-69 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314B (1965).
199. Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 1991).
200. See Norman v. General Motors Corp., 628 F. Supp. 702 (D. Nev. 1986) (ruling that
employee's cause of action for defamation against employer survives motion to dismiss);
K-Mart Corp., Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 636 ('ex. CL App. 1984) (affirming a civil cause of action for invasion of the right to privacy, specifically an intentional
intrusion upon the solitude or seclusion of another that is highly offensive to a reasonable
person); Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)
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occurs where the employer intentionally intrudes into an employee's
private affairs and such intrusion is found to be "highly offensive to
a reasonable person."' '
Several cases have been filed by non-infected employees regard-

ing their requests for additional protection when forced to work with
infected employees, or their actual refusals to work with infected employees.' However, only where an employer willfully and wantonly disregards the safety of its employees will the employer be lia-

ble.2 3 For example, in California a group of nurses claimed that
they would be exposed to unhealthful working conditions by their
hospital employer's refusal to allow them to wear protective gowns,
masks, and gloves when treating HIV patients. 24 The California Labor Commissioner found that the nurses' safety was not jeopardized

by the hospital's refusal to permit them to wear the protective attire,
as there was no health danger, in most instances, from working in an
AIDS ward without protective clothing.2 5 Therefore, the Commissioner determined that the hospital had not acted with disregard to the
best interests of its employees. The nurses have not appealed the
decision of the Labor Commissioner.
In an Illinois case, a customer of American Airlines sued the

company, alleging negligent hiring when an HIV-infected ticket agent
bit the customer during an altercation over the customer's boarding
pass.2" 6 American Airlines settled the action with its customer.

(holding that railroad employee should be awarded damages for defamation arising from letter
from employer to U.S. Labor Department), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 962, (1977); Armstrong v.
Morgan, 545 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (holding that employee may bring action
against employer doctor for libel based on allegedly false and inaccurate medical report).
201. KEETON Er AL., supra note 198, at § 652B.
202. Court Rules AIDS Handicap Under Massachusetts Law, I AIDS Pol'y and Law
(BNA) No. 18, at 2 (Sept. 24, 1986) (reporting an incident in which an employee with AIDS
was threatened by co-employees with lynching if he continued to work with the telephone
company); Sanitation Workers Refuse to Work with Colleague, 1 AIDS Pol'y and Law (BNA)
No. 12, at 7 (July 2, 1986). But see Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1199
(7th Cir.) (holding that a customer preference is not a lawful basis to reduce employment
opportunities to female flight attendants who are married), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971),
203. Wade v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 693 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1982).
204. Bernales v. City and County of San Francisco, Dep't of Pub. Health, Nos.
11-1700-1 to 11-1700-4 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r Sept. 9, 1985), reported in Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 184, at A-6 (Sept. 23, 1985) (the hospital was following the infection control
procedures suggested by the scientific community and the Centers for Disease Control).
205. Id.
206. Doe v. American Airlines, No. 86 L 19638, (Cook County Cir. Ct. Sept. 2, 1986),
reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 173, at A-5 (Sept 8, 1986); see also Lynn Rosellini
& Erica E. Goode, AIDS: When Fear Takes Charge, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 12,
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In certain cases, the employer's duty to protect its employees or
clients may be satisfied by warning those employees or clients of the
individual's condition. The employer's duty to warn20 7 is limited to
those individuals who may be potentially infected, but is also limited
by confidentiality concerns of the infected individual and whether the
information regards its employee, client, or customer.20 8 In one case,
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the risk of
transmission from certain employees of the Eastern Nebraska Human
Services Agency who have contact with mentally retarded persons
was so negligible that mandatory HIV testing violated the employees'
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. 2' However, the Fifth Circuit recently held to the contrary. In
Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners of Hospital District No. 1,210 the
court held that a licensed practical nurse, who was discharged by the
defendant after refusing to submit his HIV test results to the hospital,
had no cause of action based on a violation of his civil rights.2 '
The court found that the plaintiff had violated the hospital's infection
control policy related to reporting infectious or communicable diseases, and was not discharged because he was regarded as being HIVpositive. Additionally, the court concluded that the plaintiff was not
"otherwise qualified" under the Rehabilitation Act.21 2
If co-workers of the employee with HIV refuse to work with the
HIV-infected individual, what is the responsibility of the employer? A
national survey revealing that one in four employees would refuse to
work with an HIV-infected co-worker makes this an important question.21 3 Such a refusal may fall within the meaning of sections 2 74
and 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the "NLRA), 1
which state respectively that two or more employees have the right to
engage in concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid or protection, and that termination in response to such actions is unlawful.1 5
1987, at 62.
207. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342-44 (Cal. 1976).
208. Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv. Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 534-37 (Fla. 1987)
(holding that protection of personal information and identity of blood donor is required).
209. Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461, 464 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989).
210. 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990).
211. Id. at 831.
212. Id. at 830.
213. See Robert J. Blendon & Karen Donelan, Discrimination Against People with AIDS:

The Public Perception, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1022, 1024 (1988).
214. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1988).

215. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (holding that the con-
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The employees' fears must be based merely on an honest, good faith
belief that their safety is threatened. 16 Traditionally, this belief did

not even have to be reasonable, 27 but recently the National Labor
Relations Board and federal courts have begun to use a standard of
reasonableness related to the actions of the employees. 1 8 If the em-

ployees continue to refuse to work, however, the employer is allowed
to hire permanent replacements. 21 9 Further, pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act, an employer must provide a safe

workplace for its employees, free from conditions reasonably believed
in good faith to be hazardous.22 ° Since the employer is therefore
required to protect both the HIV-infected employee, by virtue of the
22
ADA, and the complaining employees, by virtue of the NLRA l

and the Occupational Safety and Health Act,222 the employer's only
recourse must be complete education of the workforce in order to
preclude any "good faith" belief that the employee with HIV presents
a health danger. The Occupational Health and Safety Administration

("OSHA") has, in fact, issued guidelines in connection with the maintenance of a safe working environment relating to HIV transmission.'
This advisory notice identified protective measures to be
taken by employers to prevent HIV transmission through exposure to
blood and other bodily fluids and adopted the Centers for Disease
224

Control's universal precautions policy.

duct of eight employees who refused to work, claiming that the machine shop in which they
worked was too cold and therefore dangerous, was protected activity).
216. NLRB v. Tamara Foods, Inc., 692 F.2d 1171, 1182 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that
apprehension of injury was reasonable and objectively proven in light of the commonly
known effects of exposure to the drug in question), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 928 (1983); see
also Washington Aluminum, 370 U.S. at 16, 17.
217. Washington Aluminum, 370 U.S. at 16 (citing NLRB v. Mackey Radio & Tel. Co.,
304 U.S. 333, 344 (1938)).
218. Johnson-Stewart-Johnson Mining Co., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 1982 NLRB Dec.
(CCH) 15089 (Aug. 4, 1982); see also Stepp v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec., 521
N.E.2d 350, 353 (Ind. App. 1988) (stating that employee's refusal to perform assigned tasks
on vials marked with AIDS warning labels was unreasonable).
219. See Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 99, 104-05 (7th Cir. 1969) (stating that employer may hire permanent replacements for striking workers in effort to continue operations),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
220. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1988); Tamara Foods, 692 F.2d at 1181 (stating that the
NLRA creates an express mechanism for protecting workers from employment conditions believed to pose an emergent threat of death or serious injury (citing Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980))).
221. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
222. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
223. Joint Advisory Notice, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,818 (1987).
224. See id.; see also Marco L. Colosi. AIDS: Human Rights Versus the Duty to Provide
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The Centers for Disease Control have issued guidelines for the
prevention of HIV transmission in the workplace225 and in health
care settings.2 6 If an employer fails to implement these guidelines,
there is the possibility that it may be held liable in tort for negligent
or reckless disregard for the safety of its clients or others. In addition,
OSHA has promulgated standards that, in contrast to those of the
Centers for Disease Control, are legally binding on employers, who
are subject to fines for noncompliance."
An employer is charged with knowledge of the possible means
of transmission of HIV, as contained in the official reports of OSHA
and the Center for Disease Control. In one California case, an employer terminated the employment of an individual with AIDS based
on its belief that the individual posed a risk to the health and safety
of other workers, as well as its belief that fear among co-workers
would injure company morale. 2 The California Court of Appeals
held that the employer's beliefs were irrational and insupportable, and
affirmed the lower court's determination that this type of speculation
"is exactly the sort of speculation that has been uniformly rejected as
a justification for physical handicap discrimination. 229
The issue of whether the employee's co-workers have a right to
information related to the employee's condition is an area of hot dispute. Recently, the AMA was faced with complaints from patients
regarding the responsibility of HIV-infected doctors to inform patients
of the doctors' infection.23 ° The burden of proof regarding the necessity of dissemination of HIV-related information continues to rest
with the employer.

a Safe Workplace, 39 LAB. L.J. 677, 680 (Oct. 1988) (discussing universal precautions).
225. Recommendations for the Workplace, supra note 17.
226. Recommendations for Health-Care Settings, supra note 188, at 155-65.
227. Walter J. Jones & James A. Johnson, AIDS, the Urban Policymaking Challenge, 11
J. OF URB. AFF. 85 (1989).
228. Raytheon Co. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1089, 1109-10 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 22, 1988), affd sub nom. Raytheon Co. v. Cal.
Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 212 Cal. App. 3d 1242 (Ct. App. 1989).
229. Raytheon, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 1251.
230. See Barbara Gerbert et al., Physicians and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome;
What Patients Think About Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Medical Practice, 262 JAMA
1969 (1989); see also Lawrence K. Altman, Unexpected Defiance Greets AIDS Guidelines,
N.Y. TI is, Oct. 15, 1991, at C3; B.D. Cohen, MDs Spurn AIDS Test, N.Y. NEWSDAY, June
27, 1991, at 16; Joseph Kirby, AIDS Fears Shaping Health-Care Choices, Cm-. TRIB., Aug.

19, 1991, at 1.
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CONCLUSION

Employers, of course, must be aware of the ramifications of every employment decision they make. The ADA imposes new burdens
on private employers. While the Surgeon General has recommended
that all employers develop a comprehensive fIV policy, fewer than
10 percent of executives responding to one study reported that their
companies had developed a written policy on HIV.23 ' The Surgeon
General has issued a statement proposing that:
Offices, factories, and other work sites should have a plan in operation for education of the work force and accommodation of AIDS
or ARC patients before the first such case appears at the work site.
Employees with AIDS or ARC should be dealt with as are any
oth6r workers with a chronic illness. In-house video programs provide an excellent source of education
and can be individualized to
2
the needs of a specific work group.
This type of education can eliminate unnecessary conflicts between an
infected individual and his or her co-workers, and avoid legal problems for employers. Compliance with the Surgeon General's recommendation need not be in the form of a specific "HIV policy" but
instead may require nothing more than updating present policies to
reflect an understanding that HIV will be treated as any other disability or illness, as well as developing ideas for reasonable and necessary accommodations. The decision regarding whether to merely update and reformulate a present policy or to begin from scratch is one
that should be made after reviewing the efficacy of the policy in
place and evaluating the modifications which will be necessitated by
the reformulation. z 3
To successfully integrate HIV-infected employees into a functioning work environment, organizations must understand that the education of the workforce is vital. A well-documented HIV policy is an
employer's first line of defense against a discrimination action. It is
the most simple and cost-effective means by which to reduce an

231. Alison Kittrell, Large Employers Report More Aids Cases: Survey, BUS. INS., Feb.
8, 1988, at 18, 22; see also Bill Patterson, AIDS in the Workplace: Is Your Company Prepared?, 43 TRAINING AND DEv. J. 38, 40 (1989).
232. REPORT, supra note 3, at 32.
233. For a more detailed discussion of corporate policy and program formulation, see
Laura B. Pincus & Shefali M. Trivedi, A Decade of Change, a Time for Action: HIV in the
Workplace (June 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the DePaul Business Law Journal).
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employer's potential liability. Potential benefits to the employees include gaining a greater understanding regarding the transmission of
HIV, through the provision of information on HIV and AIDS treatment, alternate sources of additional information, and an appropriate
forum for discussing employees' questions, concerns, and fears relating to the disease and workplace safety.
Education can also benefit the employer. First, employers who
are currently obligated to comply with the Rehabilitation Act could
use these information-dissemination programs to prevent potential discrimination against protected individuals by management. Used as a
proactive measure, this would ensure more successful compliance with
the Act. In addition, education programs may insulate employers
somewhat against possible litigation from their employees, in that it
would provide evidence of the employer's knowledge of and concern
for the disease. Further, the employer would reap social and economic
benefits from such a program. As stated above, in a recent poll,
twenty-five percent of the respondents stated that they would refuse
to work next to someone with AIDS."24 Therefore, these workers
may therefore be forced by their biases to quit. The cost associated
with such turnover could be substantially diminished through an education program which served to reduce or eliminate these unfounded
fears. This would be most beneficial for employers with skilled or
professional workers, since the cost of replacing these employees is
higher. Further, an education program would alleviate employee stress
and anxiety by dispelling rumors and myths about HIV. Ultimately,
the employer would benefit from the release of tension and the development of more peaceful relationships within the organization.
No matter how much education and training managers receive,
however, the reaction to news that an employee is HIV-positive remains consistently negative. Training and education must be continually reinforced to combat this tendency. In order to assist the employer in making informed, legal decisions in connection with the employment of IV-infected individuals, the National Leadership Coalition
on AIDS has promulgated a framework for workplace policies and
programs. 5 The Coalition essentially directs that employees who

234. Blendon & Donelan, supra note 213.
235. This framework provides the following:
1. Persons with HIV infection, including AIDS, have the same rights, responsibilities and opportunities as others with serious illnesses or disabilities;
2. Our employment policies comply with federal, state and local laws and regulations;
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are HIV-positive receive exactly the same benefits of employment as
a non-disabled employee. Note that this does not mean that the HIVpositive employee be treated in exactly the same way, because that
may lead to disparate results. In addition, the Coalition's framework
recognizes that an HIV-positive employee does not pose a risk to
others in the work environment through casual contact. The frame-

work also provides for an education program in order to ensure that
most HIV-related issues are avoided before they become workplace
conflicts. The Coalition contends that compliance with its articulated

principles will ensure fair treatment of the infected employee as well
as her or his co-workers, clients, and employer.

Finally, employers must beware of terminations of HIV-infected
employees for one additional reason. It is estimated that the treatment

of some AIDS patients can cost up to $250,000 per patient.1 6 An
employee may have a cause of action pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") 237 if the employer has discharged her in order to avoid incurring insurance costs. However, the
employee must show that the adverse decision was made with the

intent to deprive her of benefits, a difficult claim to support and
prove. 238 When the employer reduces the benefits payable to HIV-

infected individuals, it is acceptable and lawful as long as the reduction is applied equally to all employees filing AIDS-related claims
3. Our employment policies are based on the scientific fact that persons with HIV
infection, including AIDS, do not cause risk to others in the workplace through
ordinary workplace contact;
4. Our management and employee leaders endorse a non-discrimination policy;
5. Special training and equipment will be used when necessary, such as in health
care settings, to minimize risks to employees and others;
6. We will ensure that AIDS education is provided to all of our employees;
7. We will endeavor to ensure that education takes place before AIDS-related incidents occur in our workplace;
8. Confidentiality of persons with HIV infection and AIDS will be protected;
9. We will not screen for HIV as part of pre-employment or workplace physical
examinations;
10. We will support these policies through their clear communication to all current
and prospective employees.
NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COALITION ON AIDS, TEN PRINCIPLES FOR THE WORKPLACE (1988);
see also NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COALITION ON AIDS, SMALL BUSINESS AND AIDS (1988).

236. See Robert G. Knowles, AIDS Cost Hikes Spur Tough Employer Choices, NAT'L
UNDERWRrrER, Dec. 17, 1990, at 19 (discussing the case of one individual's medical bills
which exceeded $250,000 in a two year period).
237. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
238. See Simmons v. Willcox, 911 F.2d 1077, 1079 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming the granting of summary judgment on the grounds that the employee had failed to prove intent to
deprive her of her prison benefits).
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and the effects of the reductions would not be felt by only one employee. In one case, the employer reduced the benefits provided from
$1 million to $5,000 a mere seven months after an HIV-positive
employee filed a claim for coverage. 3 The court looked only to
the motivation of the employer for the reduction and the equity of the
application to the employees.2 10 Further, an employer who self-funds
its health care plan may limit benefits to employees with HIV.241
AIDS is a disease that must be controlled without the transgression of individual rights. AIDS and HIV sufferers are disabled and
are legally protected from employment discrimination. The HIV-infected employee may be discharged, but only after it is shown that he
or she can no longer perform the essential elements of the position
with reasonable accommodation.

239. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. granted,
sub noma.Greenberg v. H & H Music Co., 112 S. Ct. 1556 (1992).
240. Id. at 408 (holding that employers may discriminate in the creation, alteration, or
termination of employee benefit plans among category of diseases, provided that the same
plan is applied to all employees).
241. Jerry Geisel, Self-Insurers Can Limit AIDS Benefits: Court, Bus. INS., Aug. 6, 1990,
at 1, 27-28.
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